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Abstract: Drawing on empirical evidence from history and anthropology, 
we aim to demonstrate that there is room for genealogical ideology critique 
within normative political theory. The test case is some libertarians’ use of 
folk notions of private property rights in defence of the legitimacy of 
capitalist states. Our genealogy of the notion of private property shows that 
asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-
ownership cannot help settling the question of its legitimacy, because the 
notion of private property presupposed by that question is a product of the 
entity it is supposed to help legitimise: the state. We anchor our genealogical 
critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of 
language, and in current debates on the methodology of political theory. But, 
unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or 
even belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of 
ideology critique. 
 
Introduction 
In his characteristically expressive review of Anarchy, State and 
Utopia, Brian Barry compares Nozick’s position to  
…the prejudices of the average owner of a filling 
station in a small town in the Midwest who enjoys 
grousing about paying taxes and having to contribute 
to ‘welfare scroungers’ and who regards as wicked any 
attempts to interfere with contracts in the interests, for 
example, of equal opportunity or anti-discrimination 
(1975: 331).  
That is a harsh way of putting a point, yet some libertarians 
may welcome it, insofar as it exemplifies part of the intuitive appeal 
of their position: we have property rights regardless of the political 
system we live under. In this paper we contest the use of that folk 
view in arguments about the legitimacy of state power. In so doing 
we aim to offer an argument against some forms of libertarianism 
and, more importantly, the proof of concept of a new form of 
genealogical ideology critique. 
 
1 This paper’s long gestation is intertwined with the illness and premature death 
of one of its authors, Carlo Argenton, and it is dedicated to his memory. Enzo 
Rossi should take responsibility for most of the text as it now reads, but the ideas 
stem from conversations between the authors dating as far back as 2014, and 
some joint writing in 2015. The paper benefitted from being presented at the 
Dubrovnik Inter-University Centre, the LSE, SciencesPo, the University of 
Amsterdam, Sussex University, and Tulane University. Will Bosworth, Ed Hall, 
Rob Jubb, Naomi Goulder, Paul Sagar, Eric Schliesser, Nic Southwood, Matt 
Sleat, and Nicholas Vrousalis commented perceptively on various drafts. The 
Journal of Politics’ political theory editors, Lisa Ellis and Jacob T. Levy, provided 
excellent feedback and guidance, as did their anonymous referees. Enzo Rossi’s 
research was carried out within by his Dutch National Science Organisation 
‘Vidi’ project ‘Legitimacy Beyond Consent’ (grant n. 016.164.351). 
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Some argue that (some) libertarian moral assumptions are 
untenable, or that libertarian conclusions don’t follow from them. 
Thomas Nagel famously described Nozick’s position as 
‘libertarianism without foundations’ (1974)—a structural critique 
focused on the circularity between assumptions and conclusions. 
We put forward a more radical kind of critique: we try to show an 
epistemic flaw in Nozick’s attempt to justify a socio-political 
system through a normative commitment that is itself a product of 
that system. Our contention is that some of Nozick’s assumptions, 
while perhaps tenable in their own right, should not feature in the 
sorts of arguments he and others want to deploy them in. We use 
empirical evidence from history and anthropology to show that 
folk notions of private property—down to and including self-
ownership—are statist in an unacknowledged way, which 
disqualifies them from featuring in arguments about state 
legitimacy. With few important exceptions (Bertram 2014, 
Widerquist and McCall 2015, 2017), the main empirical claim we 
rely on is usually ignored by contemporary political philosophers, 
but relatively uncontroversial among the relevant specialists: folk 
commitments to the political centrality of private property are a 
product of the agency of states. 
Our critique has two substantive targets and a methodological 
upshot: (i) academic libertarianism that relies on folk notions of 
private property and, perhaps more importantly, (ii) public political 
discourse that appropriates such academic arguments in defence of 
a capitalist socio-political system. The latter is the ‘everyday 
libertarianism’ Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) attack by 
arguing on conceptual and moral grounds that property rights are 
conventional. Ours is not a conceptual or moral argument, but an 
empirically-informed genealogical critique of some aspects of capitalist 
ideology. So the methodological upshot of our argument is that (iii) 
genealogical considerations can have purchase in normative 
political theory: a look at salient facts reveals the inadequacies of 
the abstractions in certain hypothetical arguments, and of the 
excessive reliance on ‘common sense’ or ‘intuitive’ judgments 
found in certain styles of normative political theory—parts of 
Nozick’s argument being just examples of political philosophers’ 
tendency to rely on such judgments.  
To be sure, the general appeal of liberal rights is left largely 
untouched by our argument. The argument suggests, however, that 
it is prudent to investigate the genealogy of concepts featured in 
arguments with high political stakes, especially when those 
arguments can be used to defend the most powerful in society, 
since ideology tends to skew in their favour. But our strategy differs 
from broadly Gramscian or Foucauldian approaches: we do not 
aim to debunk all talk of private property, let alone the whole 
ideological background of such talk, but just the use of folk beliefs 
about private property in one specific kind of argument. We 
maintain that such targeted genealogical debunking is best placed 
to engage productively with contemporary political philosophy. 
Our approach is also an advance relative to standard Marxian 
3 
interest-based ideology critiques, as it draws only on empirical 
evidence and the epistemic properties of beliefs, not on more 
normatively contestable attributions of interests to social classes. 
And we do not purport to offer our critique from an ideologically 
neutral standpoint; we merely argue that some beliefs are 
ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, which we expound. 
To cement this point we draw on recent work on genealogy and 
ideology in philosophy and language and epistemology, as well as 
on current debates on the methodology of political philosophy. 
The basic libertarian argument we discuss can be summarised 
as follows: 
P1: Any socio-political system that emerges and 
reproduces itself without violations of self-ownership 
is legitimate.  
P2: A capitalist system can emerge and reproduce itself 
without violations of self-ownership. 
C: A capitalist system can be legitimate. 
Note the ‘can’ in the second premise. 2  That argument is 
hypothetical. Factual considerations about how capitalism came 
about in the actual world cannot disprove the second premise. 
However—and this is the crux of our argument—the actual history 
of capitalism and the related genealogy of our notion of self-
ownership lead us to conclude that asking whether a capitalist state can 
emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling questions of state 
legitimacy, because the notion of private property presupposed by that question 
is a product of the private property-protecting state it is supposed to legitimise 
(and that sort of state, in turn, is a precondition for the 
development of a capitalist socio-political system). Put another 
way, facts cannot prove Nozick’s hypothetical story false; but they 
can show that the question Nozick asks presupposes the falsity of 
the real history of property rights and the state. A politically central 
notion of private property could have emerged independently of 
the state; but the fact that it didn’t disqualifies it from featuring as 
a ‘common sense’ assumption in arguments about state legitimacy 
in the actual world.  
Now, to partly anticipate an objection, let us grant that the idea 
of a moral right to private property is, in principle, unconnected to 
the history of how one came to believe in such a right, or how the 
corresponding legal rights emerged. There could be moral rights 
even if nobody believed in them, or if anyone who believed in them 
had been brainwashed by someone who benefits from that belief—
this is why debunking ideology critiques are often accused of 
committing the genetic fallacy. The question remains: why rest 
arguments on common sense beliefs in moral rights to private 
property if those beliefs have been acquired in an epistemically 
suspect way? That question can be ignored by natural law theorists, 
Platonists of various stripes, and so on. Our argument does not 
touch such and other philosophical defences of property rights, 
 
2 Some would argue that only capitalism can emerge and reproduce itself without 
violations of self-ownership rights. By discussing the less controversial version 
of the argument we cast a wider net. 
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such as personhood-based accounts (Gradin 1982), or the 
consequentialist or conventionalist accounts prevalent among 
contemporary libertarians (Brennan, van der Vossen & Schmidtz 
2017). It touches arguments that relies on the common sense 
appeal of property rights in theories of state legitimacy.3 Still, even 
with this domain restriction to explicitly or implicitly anti-
foundationalist arguments, the question is not rhetorical, which is 
why we shall provide an account of ideology in support of our 
preferred answer.  
 The paper’s structure is this. We set the stage with an 
exposition of the view we critique, with a focus on Nozick’s 
invisible-hand theory of state legitimacy. We then look at empirical 
evidence on the real-world counterpart of the invisible hand story. 
In the subsequent section we provide an account of ideology that 
sets out the desiderata for an effective genealogical debunking, 
which we carry out in the penultimate section. Building on that, in 
the conclusion we discuss the methodological pitfalls in 
genealogically unexamined political moralism. 
 
From self-ownership to the capitalist state  
The variant of libertarianism we engage is a thesis about self-
ownership and the state. 4  It says that the only type of state 
compatible with self-ownership is a minimal state, tasked solely 
with protecting the private property holdings of its citizens 
(derived from self-ownership plus a theory of appropriation of 
external resources), and consequently upholding a capitalist system 
of exchange. So the libertarianism we discuss is not just any 
defence of a market-based or market-centred socio-political 
system. It has similar conclusions to neoliberalism, or market 
liberalism, or classical liberalism, but it is not the same view insofar 
as it has a distinctive justificatory route to these conclusions, 
characterised by a focus on individuals’ entitlements. 
Another way to pick out the libertarianism that is the target of 
our critique is indeed to distinguish between desert- and 
entitlement-based justifications of capitalism (Olsaretti 2004: 2-5): 
one may be entitled to an inheritance without thereby deserving it, 
and vice-versa. Desert-based justifications appeal to a substantive 
principle of distributive justice: just distributions conform to a 
pattern determined by a conception of desert (e.g. that nobody 
deserves more than anyone else, or less than they need to survive, 
say). Such patterns are irrelevant for the purposes of entitlement-
based justifications, which assess political arrangements solely on 
the basis of whether they came about without violating the rights 
of those affected.   
 Robert Nozick’s libertarianism (1974) is the archetypal 
entitlement theory. Like most libertarians, Nozick takes anarchism 
seriously. He doesn’t just offer arguments in favour of his preferred 
 
3 As Nozick puts it, his book “does not present a precise theory of the moral 
basis of individual rights” (1974: xiv). 
4 So we set aside accounts of libertarianism not grounded in the inviolability of 
individual rights.  
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political system. He nests those arguments within a theory of why 
we should have a state rather than not. He then constructs a theory 
of justice in close connection to this theory of legitimacy. In fact 
Nozick’s political theory, i.e. his theory of legitimacy and justice, is 
in three parts: (i) an entitlement-based argument for the moral 
permissibility of a minimal state (as opposed to anarchy), (ii) an 
argument against pattern-based theories of distributive justice, and 
(iii) an argument for the desirability of the minimal state. Both (i) 
and (iii) are necessary to meet the anarchist’s challenge, as the 
anarchist can claim that the state is morally impermissible, and/or 
that it is undesirable. Here we will focus primarily on (i), and remain 
neutral on the extent to which (ii) and (iii) depend on it. We will 
look closely at one of the two pillars of Nozick’s theory of 
legitimacy, namely the argument for the state’s moral permissibility, 
in which Nozick asks us to imagine a state of nature-type scenario. 
The key to the moral permissibility of the state is not to be found 
in consent, but in an invisible-hand story showing that a state could 
arise without any rights-violations. The story aims to show that the 
state would be the preferred solution to a range of relevant 
problems. What is more, such a state could emerge voluntarily but 
unintentionally, or at any rate not by design.  
For our purposes a simplified outline of Nozick’s story will 
suffice, as we won’t be taking issue with its substance, which has 
been widely criticised (Bader 2010: 81-85), but rather with the 
method. The story begins in an anarchic situation, with individuals 
in charge of the enforcement of their own moral rights.  Nozick 
doesn’t paint an overly pessimistic, Hobbesian picture of this 
situation: he imagines a high level of compliance with his rights-
based moral order. Nonetheless, to safeguard their rights more 
effectively people will form mutual-protection associations tasked 
with enforcing members’ rights. To maximise efficiency those 
associations will gradually evolve into professional organisations. 
One of those agencies will become dominant and then, Nozick 
argues, it will be able to claim a state-like monopoly of violence 
without violating anyone’s rights (1974: 16-17). The minimal state 
is tasked only with enforcing citizens’ negative rights, i.e. rights of 
non-interference with bodily integrity, movement, property 
transactions, and so on. This nightwatchman state, then, supports 
the development of a capitalist social system: there are no limits to 
the accumulation of rightfully acquired private property, few 
restrictions on freedom of contract, and redistribution is limited to 
the mere cost of enforcing negative rights.    
Note that the invisible hand theory is about the justification of 
the state, not of (private) property. As we’ll see in more detail 
below, Nozick’s account of appropriation depends on his 
assumption that individuals are self-owners, which in turn 
presupposes some notion of private property rights. Property 
rights can be divided in two sets: rights of self-ownership and of 
world-ownership. The former are assumed as the theory’s starting 
point. The latter are the product of the former plus some theory of 
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justice in acquisition, transfer, and rectification.5 We return to the 
relationship between self-ownership and world-ownership below. 
For now it will be enough to note that self-ownership is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for explaining private ownership of 
parts of the external world.  
That sketch of Nozick’s theory of legitimacy indicates how his 
story features many of the modes of social interaction—and, 
presumably, the underpinning normative commitments—familiar 
from life under a capitalist system. And he doesn’t presuppose just 
their existence (they predate capitalism and states after all) but also 
their distinctly capitalist political pre-eminence relative to other 
features of social life. As we’ll see in some detail, the point here is 
that Nozick’s state of nature is decidedly oriented in the direction 
of the system Nozick intends to ground. By now we know better 
than to demand a blank slate-like original position. Still, there is a 
spectrum of more or less appropriate ways to front-load 
hypothetical scenarios with normative commitments.  Is this 
particular hypothetical a good way to justify a capitalist social 
system? That partly depends on how the capitalist social system 
actually came about. 
 
Actually-existing capitalism 
How does Nozick's hypothetical state of nature compare to its 
counterparts in the actual world? Nozick himself thought the 
question mattered (1974: 293-294), though, as we’ll see in the next 
section, for different reasons from ours. For now, suffice it to say 
that, even though Nozick’s invisible hand story is a counterfactual, 
the question matters because it points to the sorts of assumptions 
that should and shouldn’t feature in the antecedent of any 
conditional whose consequent is meant to have normative 
relevance in the actual world. Nozick’s project of justifying 
capitalism as the possible historical product of voluntary 
cooperation between original acquisitors requires us to imagine 
pre-political individuals with a strong folk belief in the political 
salience of their private property entitlements. In this section we 
adduce empirical evidence for the claim that, in the actual world, 
that folk belief is largely a product of the state, due to two distinct 
but related historical developments. Crudely, the first one is the 
creation by the first states of an order in which individual private 
property is central and politically salient. The second one is the 
early modern state-backed rise of capitalism. In subsequent 
sections we show how those facts turns out to be a problem for 
Nozick.6 But before approaching the evidence, let us introduce a 
working definition of the state, and two distinctions: between the 
market and capitalism, and between individual and collective 
private property.  
 
5 Cf. Bader 2010: 188, 190, who maintains that it is unproblematic to assume a 
need for private property in the external word, even though it’s hard to explain 
exactly what gives rise to it.  
6 Strictly speaking, either of those facts would suffice for our argument to go 
through. 
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 For our present purposes we can follow anthropologists 
and archaeologists and think of the state as the political entity 
continuous with the successors of early chiefdoms. Predynastic 
Egypt, the preclassic Maya, the Uruk period in the Middle East, 
Shang China, and the Harappan period in the Indus Valley are 
some of the most prominent examples. Most of their distinguishing 
features—hierarchical and codified authority structures, 
urbanisation, a bureaucracy, a measure of military control over 
their territory, and the raising of taxes—are still shared with 
modern states (Scott 2017, Wengrow 2010), though those are far 
more tentacular in their reach and far more internally coherent, to 
a degree approximating a qualitative rather than just quantitative 
change, especially as regards the “unity of authority” (Levy 2017: 
5). 
 We can think of the market as the domain of voluntary 
exchange of goods. This definition allows for the compossibility of 
(some) market relations and a number of social and cultural 
systems. All that has to be present for market relations to emerge 
is the willingness to exchange a good for another. Thus defined 
market relations have been with us for such a long time that it 
would be difficult to speak of them as anything else but ‘natural’ to 
humanity, given the limits of autarchy. This does not mean that the 
act of exchanging always has the same meaning for the two parties 
involved, nor that self-interest is always the sole or primary driving 
force (Deagan and Cruxent 2002), nor that exchange is a dominant 
or even important organising principle of society (Granovetter 
1985).  
On the other hand, capitalism, at least as we know it—there 
could be roads not taken, as there certainly are other theoretical 
possibilities—is a system of productive relations in which the 
market and the state take specific, prominent roles. As our 
historical discussion below will explain, the system revolves around 
four key elements: (i) individual private property, (ii) wage labour 
as a means of subsistence and consumption for a large part of the 
population, (iii) the sanctioned aim of profit-maximisation on the 
part of the owners of capital, and (iv) state-enforcement of (i)-(iii). 
Whilst such a system can coexist and vary with a number of socio-
cultural backgrounds, their range is substantially narrower than that 
allowed by market relations (Hall & Soskice 2001).  
Element (i) is crucial here, and leads to our second distinction: 
individual private property (henceforth PP1), as opposed to collective 
private property (henceforth PP2). Private property is, 
fundamentally, a matter of socially sanctioned exclusion, as 
prominent conceptual accounts put it (Merrill 1998, Penner 1997):7 
it is a matter of drawing boundaries around a certain resource or 
resource system and policing access to it (McKean and Ostrom 
1995)—a variable practice best thought of as “a continuum from 
identification and association with things to social and political 
 
7 Here we characterise property in formal terms, and remain neutral on the 
normative issues of the interests and values it may protect (Dagan 2003) or the 
function it may serve (Waldron 1988).  
8 
possession to ownership enforced by the rule of written law” (Earle 
2017: 3). Roughly, when communities engage in this form of 
exclusion or privatisation we have PP2; when individuals do it we 
have PP1. To be sure, this distinction ranges over standard 
anthropological and archaeological classifications, which normally 
envisage a more complex picture featuring commons, institutional 
property, and various versions of private property (Gilman 1998). 
In the introduction to an important two-volume collection on the 
anthropology property and inequality, in fact, we read: “When 
investigated ethnographically, all property regimes seem to be more 
or less ordered conglomerates of both private rights and communal 
rights” (Widlok 2005: 8). Our distinction is just meant to 
individuate the idealtyp of PP1, the form of private property that 
features in Nozick’s argument. PP1 is present when the type of 
resources essential to the productive activities that sustain 
society—capital, if you will—can be held by individuals.  
That development in turn reconfigures key aspects of a 
community’s political arrangements. So we must begin to introduce 
the anthropological and historical evidence, which shows how PP1 
should not be considered a politically neutral baseline, pace Nozick.  
If there is anything that emerges as such a baseline from the 
historical and anthropological record is a virtually unanimous 
understanding of property as PP2.8 Let us trace a schematic history 
of the evolution of property relations. Bearing in mind that the 
process is neither linear nor synchronic, the mainstream view 
among anthropologist is that, as an influential review article puts it, 
“social evolution can be characterized heuristically as having 
overlapping institutional scales of organization: the family level 
(bands), local groups (tribes), chiefdoms, and states. […] Special 
forms of property can be associated with increasingly broad levels 
of integration.” (Earle 2000: 45). Indeed, until about 12,000 years 
ago, all humans lived in hunter-gathering or foraging bands. A 
standard feature of band societies of this kind, and of hundreds of 
village and/or tribe-based societies as well, is a land tenure system 
based on some variation of PP2 (Lee and Daly 1999). Though 
moveable property tends to be held by individuals, land—the main 
productive resource—is held by a kinship-based collective, 
typically sustained by an ethos of reciprocity. Generally, the 
purpose of access to land and other key productive resources was 
sustenance, and sustenance required appropriation of some kind. 
What it did not require, however, was individual ownership in 
Lockean-Nozickian, PP1 sense of the term. The prevailing 
principle was that no individual (or, most commonly, family) could 
claim exclusive use of any piece of land, and no individual or family 
could be excluded from resources they needed to subsist 
(Widerquist & McCall 2015). Usually this principle required some 
 
8 So the PP1-PP2 distinction allows us to make our argument while remaining 
neutral on the controversy between conventionalist and natural right accounts 
of property (Bertram 2014): we do not need to take a position on whether 
property tout court is tied to innate abilities, since our focus is on the transition 
from one kind of property to another. 
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form of use-rights, not exclusive individual ownership. If at all, 
exclusive ownership took the PP2 form, with the entire band as the 
original appropriator (Fried 1967: 201). With some partial 
exceptions in pastoralist societies (Porter 2012), the key 
consideration remained land use, not the exclusive individual 
ownership of property (Sahlins 1974: 92-93).  
 The first sedentary, village-based tribal societies also largely 
adhered to this pattern. This becomes especially clear once we 
abandon the now discredited view of a linear evolution from 
foraging to agriculture, wih the latter as the enabler or sedentism. 
As James Scott shows in a recent book summarising vast quantities 
of empirical research, sedentism predates agriculture (Scott 2017). 
So, even though Rousseau’s old conjectural linkage between 
agriculture, sedentism and inequality doesn’t quite stand up to 
empirical scrutiny, Scott shows convincingly that agriculture is 
indeed key to state formation and thus inequality, as we’ll see 
shortly, after a brief discussion of the state’s predecessor, the 
chiefdom.  
 Chiefdoms have been shown to represent the first phase of a 
process of PP1-like privatisation.9  Typically, land was removed 
from the commons and ownership transferred to groups or 
institutions. If one looks for PP1 one finds that "there is no 
evidence (...) that such land existed in most early civilizations" 
(Trigger 2003: 332). Nonetheless chiefs were individuals who were 
powerful enough—in a context of population pressure and thus 
increasing competition for scarce land resources—to appropriate 
for their clans land previously held in common (Earle 2017). 
Access to land became restricted, with small sections of the 
population now in a position to determine who had access to what, 
typically in connection with gendered and kin-defined hierarchies 
(Bouchard 2011, Gailey 1985).  
 The dynamics of appropriation in early states intensified this 
process:  
Based on historical and archaeological evidence, complex 
societies rested on the development of property rights 
well before capitalism. […] The emergence of the state 
was an outcome of social stratification in which the ruling 
institutions defended differential access to or ownership 
of strategic resources by military means […] central 
power, whether comparatively strong or weak, arises 
from property rights (Earle 2000: 44).  
 That is to say, property rights are an instrumentum regni. A 
crucial aspect of the process was the need to use PP1 in part as a 
strategy to raise taxes: an influential study of seven cases across a 
wide variation in time and space (Aztec, Maya, Yoruba-Benin, 
Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Shang China) concludes that "the 
 
9  However some Holocene complex foraging societies, which preceded 
chiefdoms, may represent a small exception to the PP2 norm by displaying a 
family-based variant of PP1 (Johnsen 1986). Yet even uncertainty about the 
origins of private property would be enough to cast doubt on the view we attack, 
since we argue that the view requires the falsity of the actual history of PP1. 
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replacement of collectively owned land by increasing proportions 
of [...] privately owned land is correlated with compelling farmers 
and farm labourers to produce and surrender increasing amounts 
of surplus food" (Trigger 2003: 336). Another, related, common 
way in which private land originally spread can be traced to the 
decision on the part of these rulers to reward officials and others 
members of the elite for their services with exclusive titles to land 
(Trigger 2003: 147).10 The common element here can be brought 
into focus through Scott’s theory of the agrarian origins of the early 
states: “the embryonic state arises by harnessing the late Neolithic 
grain and manpower module as a basis of control and 
appropriation.” (2017: 116) With sedentism and various effective 
means for self-sufficiency in place, the emergent state elites had to 
find coercive ways to funnel their subjects’ productive activities 
into the types of agriculture that produced an elite-appropriable 
surplus. So “each of the earliest states deployed its own unique mix 
of coerced labor” (ibid.: 152-3). We may then see the gradual rolling 
out of PP1 as a way to overcome this direct form of coercion and 
bring forth a more familiar (to us) situation: “Only much later, 
when the world was, as it were, fully occupied and the means of 
production privately owned or controlled by state elites, could the 
control of the means of production (land) alone suffice, without 
institutions of bondage, to call forth a surplus.” (Ibid.: 153) 
A valuable interpretive key of that process can be found in the 
idea of “state simplification", from Scott’s earlier work on state 
formation (1998). According to Scott, the state—and the modern 
state even more so—is an institution that strives to make the 
population and territory it exerts control over as “legible” as 
possible, to manage it more effectively. Importantly, for Scott the 
state does not just ‘read’ its population and territory in a simplified 
manner, but also actively and coercively shapes these in the direction 
of greater simplicity and standardisation. The transition from the 
complexity of PP2 to the simplicity of PP1 can be read as such a 
state simplification. Through PP1 the state made property relations 
more legible, manageable, and most importantly taxable (ibid.)—a 
crucial element in the state-agriculture-PP1 nexus. This pattern is 
characteristic of all early states. Indeed we think Scott’s insight 
about their agricultural roots is a useful buttress for the standard 
account of the link between property and the state, once we 
combine it with his theory of state simplification and legibility: 
“Tributary economies of both chiefdoms and precapitalist states 
require alienation of value to finance stratification and institutional 
elaboration. […] elite ownership (and the corresponding ability to 
extract tribute from commoners) was basic to the emergence of 
social complexity.” (Earle 2000: 44). Note the emphasis on 
taxation. And this is what Scott says about all early states and their 
dependence on cultivated grains: “The key to the nexus between 
grains and states lies, I believe, in the fact that only the cereal grains 
can serve as a basis for taxation: visible, divisible, assessable, 
 
10  Comparable processes can be observed in shepherding societies as well 
(Farringdon 2005).   
11 
storable, transportable, and ‘rationable’” (Scott 2017: 129). The 
early state’s dependence on agriculture, then, requires PP1 as an 
instrument to make resources legible: “Land, happily for the tax 
collector, does not move. But as the Qin recognized private 
landholding, it conducted an elaborate cadastral survey connecting 
each piece of cropland with an owner/taxpayer.” (ibid.: 146) In a 
nutshell, PP1 both drives state formation and is a tool of its 
entrenchment. 
To be sure, the variants of PP1 implemented by early states do 
not have all of the features of modern capitalist property. 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, we can tie individual property titles 
to the early states, and that remains a necessary condition for the 
subsequent developments that will see the rise of European 
capitalism in connection with the modern state—the second 
historical development mentioned above. This story is both more 
familiar and more contested. The familiar part is that capitalism as 
a distinctive productive system comes into existence in England 
around the 18th century, and that, more recently still, European 
colonialism was the principal cause for the spread of this radical 
simplification of ownership titles and notions of property to the 
rest of the world, as most research indicates.11  
Exactly how this came about is controversial. We will not take 
sides in those debates, but highlight historical developments so as 
to see how, under the modern state, the early states’ relatively 
fragile reliance on PP1 was reinforced and became the entrenched 
system that sustains capitalism as we know it. So, for instance, 
legal-institutionalist scholars show how capitalism results from 
purposeful legal and political action on the part of the state (Deakin 
et al. 2016), exemplified most clearly by the state-driven 
financialisation of PP1 in the England of the early 18th Century, 
achieved mainly via the legal conceptualisation of land as collateral 
and debt as saleable property, which in turn enabled the 
development and explosive growth of the industrial and proto-
industrial economy we typically associate with capitalism (Hodgson 
2016). A more familiar yet compatible narrative and, importantly 
for our purposes, one that attributes an equally central role to the 
state, starts a little earlier. It looks at how land came to become 
something that could be used as debt collateral, and so centres on 
the long process of land tenure reforms in England from the 16th 
to the 19th Century. The importance of the enclosure of the 
commons—the state’s coercive turning of PP2 into PP1—to the 
rise of capitalism is well-known: Georgian-era landowners used 
their influence on the state to appropriate common land and erode 
customary use-rights. In the process they deprived a large 
population of their means of subsistence, forcing them to seek 
employment in the nascent textile and other industries. Ellen 
Meiksins Wood (2002) enriches that standard narrative by 
extending it into the past and sharpening the picture of the role of 
the state. She shows that the enclosure movement couldn’t have 
 
11 E.g., Parker (1989) for the case of Native Americans, Kalit and Young (1997) 
for Aboriginal Australians, and Oldenburg (2002) for India. 
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succeeded without the “distinctive political centralization of the 
English state” (ibid.: 99), achieved already in the 16th Century. 
Furthermore, she shows how the Lockean-biblical ethos of land 
improvement—used to justify much of the enclosure movement—
provided the basis for capitalist productivism, later to be 
sublimated in the industrial era: “the landlord who puts his land to 
productive use, who improves it, even if it is by means of someone 
else’s labour, is being industrious … The kind of appropriation that 
can be called ‘productive’ is distinctively capitalist.” (ibid.: 112-3)    
So, in a somewhat speculative way, we can say that our focus 
on the political centrality of PP1 as tool of state simplification and 
on its origin as property in land allows us to trace a long arç 
spanning from Scott’s theory of the agrarian origin of the state to 
Meiksins Wood’s account of the agrarian roots of capitalism.  
Definitions of capitalism vary; yet all accept that the political 
centrality of PP1 is a necessary condition for its emergence. As 
Hume and Kant understood, property is not a relation between a 
subject and an object, but a social construct. A change in property 
relations is premised on a change in social relations. The state—in 
both its pre-modern and modern articulations—brought about 
such radical transformations in social relations, critical expressions 
of which were the implementation and subsequent entrenchment 
of the political salience of PP1.  
 
Ideology and political moralism  
How do the empirics we just discussed advance the argument 
outlined earlier? The working account of ideology we require to 
support our genealogical debunking of the role of PP1 in 
arguments about state legitimacy such as Nozick’s has two main 
desiderata. According to the realist desideratum, ideology critique 
must eschew unexamined pre-political moral commitments—
lapsing into political moralism, to use Williams’ terminology—as 
they may turn out have the same status as the object of our critique. 
According to the debunking desideratum, it must steer clear of the 
‘genetic fallacy’, namely the mistake of confusing the problematic 
causal history of a belief with the lack of independent arguments in 
its favour.  
The realist desideratum matters insofar as the critic wants to 
distance herself methodologically from the object of critique. This 
is a standard move within the Marxian tradition of ideology 
critique, which is sceptical of morality-driven critiques of the status 
quo, insofar as “effective norms of right and justice (if correctly 
understood in their actual social function) are largely weapons of 
the oppressive class.” (Wood 2004: 145). But, even though it is 
compatible with it, the desideratum does not require commitment 
to that general approach. Here we are criticising libertarians who 
help themselves to a folk moral belief in private property rights to 
support a controversial political position. Any critique of this move 
cannot itself rely on any such folk beliefs—at least not without 
subjecting them to the same critical standards, which would derail 
the exercise. So one may want to bracket Williams’ own account of 
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the underpinnings of the Critical Theory Principle: “an aspiration 
to the most basic sense of freedom, that of not being in the power 
of another” (2002: 231). It is at least not obvious that aspiration 
differs in relevant ways from, say, the aspiration to hold secure 
private property rights.12 The worry is not that Williams’s appeal to 
freedom is vulnerable to challenge from other rights, but that it is 
as genealogically unexamined as Nozick’s appeal to property rights. 
To avoid that worry while retaining the causal element in the 
critical theory principle we propose to motivate it with epistemic 
rather than moral considerations, by (i) displacing the causal 
element from the process of belief acquisition tout-court to the origin 
of the meaning of the relevant concept, which in turn will help us 
(ii) explain in epistemic terms why some folk beliefs are 
problematically resistant to rational revision, and thus ideological 
in the pejorative sense. 
Move (i) draws on a recent reformulation of the social 
constructionist critique of ideology by Sally Haslanger, which relies 
on the distinction between internalism and externalism in 
semantics. Crudely, the thought is that insofar as concepts such as 
‘private property’ are embedded in social practices, their meaning 
“is determined not simply by intrinsic facts about us but at least in 
part by facts about our environment.” (2012: 395).13 Regardless of 
speakers’ apparent competence in deploying the concept in 
ordinary language, because of the ways in which dominant social 
forces shapes the common ground of meaning, the concept cannot 
be investigated simply by appeal to our intuitions (semantic 
internalism), but rather “will need to draw on empirical 
social/historical inquiry” (ibid.: 396 — semantic externalism). 
Attention to the causal history of the concept will then provide a 
better understanding of how the concept works (ibid.: 132-137), as 
in the social realm there is often a difference between the ‘manifest’ 
and the ‘operative’ concept (ibid.: 387-390). One can be a 
competent user of the manifest concept without fully 
understanding the operative concept, which is why we can carry 
out empirically-informed ameliorative conceptual analysis, e.g. to 
determine “whether our gender and race vocabularies in fact track 
social kinds that are typically obscured by the manifest content of 
our everyday concepts” (ibid.: 224).  
In the case of race, say, this is a way to account for its social 
construction, and so to open some avenues for critique. In the case 
of private property, the manifest concept of private property is one 
that sees this right as a constraint on state activity, and so as a 
 
12 This point holds even if one—correctly—understands Williams’ appeal to 
freedom as subject to a ‘realism constraint’ that makes it sensitive to context 
(Hall 2015: 4-6). Hall also suggests that this aspiration is a naturalized ‘want’ 
rather than a belief. For a rejection of this sort of move in relation to ideology 
critique see Stanley (2015: 187-189). Alternatively one may read the appeal to 
freedom as a necessary condition for the exercise of one’s epistemic faculties 
(Aytac forthcoming), in which case our position would still be fairly close to 
Williams’s. 
13 As in the familiar naturalised investigation of the meaning of natural kinds 
such as ‘water’. 
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notion that can feature in accounts of state legitimacy. But our 
causal reconstruction of the notion of PP1 shows a different 
operative concept: PP1 is best thought of as one of the tools 
employed by the state to make the social world legible (in Scott’s 
sense) and to give structure to its rule. The meaning of PP1, then, 
is best understood partly by considering the causal history of the 
concept and the role it plays in our social and political practices. 
The empirical component of our analysis provides an epistemic 
reason to divert our attention from the manifest to the operative 
concept of private property—the latter simply is a more accurate 
description of the concept’s role in our practices.  
In response to anyone wishing to defend the primacy of 
intuitions and ‘common sense’ understandings of socially relevant 
concepts (i.e. the manifest concept), we can buttress the 
genealogical critique with Jason Stanley’s (2015) account of 
ideology as epistemically flawed, rational revision-resistant belief—
move (ii) above. The relevant belief here would be something along 
the lines of “Private property is a normative commitment whose 
appeal as a central political commitment is independent of the 
existence of states (and so can feature in the legitimation of 
states.)” In light of the empirical evidence we provided, there is 
reason to rationally revise that belief—to move away from the 
manifest concept and towards the operative one. Any residual 
surviving appeal of the manifest concept of PP1 as state-
independent would be, following Stanley, ideological in the 
pejorative sense: “The distinctive feature of ideological belief is that 
it is very difficult to rationally revise in light of counter evidence”, 
because of its connection to social practices (ibid.: 184).14 There are 
social structures that inhibit revision of beliefs such as those tied 
to the concept of PP1 as a state-independent, central political 
constraint. Those structures are especially resilient when, as in the 
case at hand, the ideologically flawed version of the concept 
advances the interests of the most powerful in society, or what 
psychologists call “system-justifying ideologies” (Jost & Hunyady 
2005). That is to say, power inhibits our appreciation of evidence—
the ideological flaw is an epistemic flaw.  
 So we have provided two jointly sufficient conditions for 
triggering the Critical Theory Principle: that an epistemically 
ameliorable politically charged concept features in the relevant 
argument, and that this concept is resistant to amelioration despite 
the empirical evidence. Note how the identification of the 
epistemic flaw rests on the plausibility of the causal account of the 
operative concept,15 so the debunking desideratum is met. But no 
moral notions are invoked in the debunking process: the flaw is 
epistemic, so the realistic desideratum is met. 
 
14 Here Stanley’s account of ideologically flawed belief chimes with Haslanger’s 
semantic externalism: “… while I theorize with a category of ideological belief 
… this does not mean that I think that being ideological is an intrinsic property 
of mental states” (2015: 186). 
15 We use a causal theory of reference rather than of knowledge so we can remain 
neutral on whether the folk beliefs at hand constitute knowledge. 
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Abstractions and reality    
We can now leverage our historical and genealogical observations 
and our account of ideology to mount an objection to entitlement-
based defences of capitalism. The empirical evidence discussed 
above shows how what is often taken by libertarians to be the 
spontaneous expression of the free individual human will—i.e. 
PP1-based capitalism—turns out to be something of a radically 
different nature. Without the state, PP1 would not be what it is. 
But why does this matter for a hypothetical, normative theory such 
as Nozick’s? Crudely, because the political salience of private 
property rights was established by the state’s political power, and 
only later became part of a widely shared moral vocabulary. So, 
when justifying or seeking to limit the state’s authority, libertarians 
cannot simply help themselves to folk beliefs about rights. 
Raymond Geuss’ pithy observation applies here: “Ethics is usually 
dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching 
out to extend its grip to the present and the future” (2008: 42).  
Let us begin by restating the basic argument we discuss: 
P1: Any socio-political system that emerges and 
reproduces itself without violations of individual 
rights is legitimate.  
P2: (Only) capitalism can emerge and reproduce itself 
without violations of individual rights. 
C: (Only) capitalism can be legitimate. 
We should now unpack it to see exactly what role private 
property (PP1) plays in it: 
P1: People have private property rights over their 
bodies (self-ownership). 
P2: Self-owners can legitimately acquire external 
private property.  
P3: Private property enables legitimate market 
transactions (free market).  
P4: (Only) a state no bigger than a minimal state can 
arise spontaneously and legitimately as a result of a 
process kick-started through market transactions.16  
C: Given a commitment to private property rights, 
(only) such a minimal state can be legitimate.  
PP1 plays a role both within self-ownership and world-
ownership (i.e. acquisition of external property; we return to this 
distinction towards the end of this section). The common 
understanding of self-ownership requires PP1, so much so that 
sophisticated philosophical critiques are needed to cash out 
relationship to our own bodies in non-property terms (e.g. 
Pateman 2002), though our argument does not depend on those 
critiques. At any rate, the argument can be understood as a 
conditional: if there can be private property before the state, then 
a minimal state can emerge without coercion. Notice how, given 
its level of abstraction, the antecedent treats as equivalent two very 
 
16 Here we can ignore the transition from Nozick ‘ultra-minimal state’ to the 
minimal state. 
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different pictures of statelessness, or of the state of nature: 
situation A, in which some or even a majority of people hold a 
normative commitment to PP1 amongst their many other 
commitments, and a situation B, in which PP1 is a near-inviolable 
moral constraint on political action and so has to become the 
centrepiece of political order, as per Nozick’s account of rights as 
‘side constraints’. We have seen that A is a fairly accurate 
description of the world before states. B, on the other hand, could 
be described as a situation that might obtain if today’s capitalist 
states disappeared overnight. Now, while a spontaneous transition 
from A to B is strictly-speaking possible, the empirical evidence we 
presented in the previous section shows that it never occurred in 
actual history despite vast contextual differences. The widespread 
acceptance of the centrality of private property to political order 
postdates the state, and is a product of its agency, though not only 
of its agency. That does not make the argument unsound or invalid, 
but it does show that, in order to get the desired pro-capitalist 
conclusions, Nozick has to build equally pro-capitalist normative 
commitments into the premises. The argument is not as 
parsimonious as it purports to be.  
But our charge is not simply one of circularity, for a libertarian 
might well reply that she is simply spelling out the implication of 
the appealing, intuitive normative commitment to private property 
rights. We aim to show that libertarians are not entitled to help 
themselves to ‘common sense’ intuitions and beliefs about private 
property rights for the purpose of justifying the state. Our 
objection—in its crudest form—is that libertarians cannot use the 
intuitive appeal of private property entitlements in their defence of the capitalist 
state, because the historical record shows that widespread belief in the central 
political relevance of those commitments is the causal product of the very coercive 
order the belief is meant to support. One could have formed that belief 
in some other way; but given the empirical evidence in support of 
the state as the proximate cause, the burden is on the libertarian to 
show that the belief is warranted by other considerations.  
To be sure, a philosophically sophisticated freestanding defence 
of PP1 as a near-absolute side constraint could be found, just as 
our critique can be formulated despite the social pressures in 
support of the political centrality of PP1. But the point remains 
that the widespread, folk appeal of PP1 vaunted by libertarians is 
susceptible to genealogical debunking. In other words, to resist our 
argument libertarians would have to navigate some troubled 
philosophical waters that they often, and understandably, try to 
avoid—e.g. by starting out with the assumption that “people have 
rights” (Nozick 1974: 1).17 The common sense appeal of PP1 is not 
 
17 Thomas Scanlon (1976) and Eric Mack (2014) have argued that Nozick’s self-
conscious antifoundationalism about rights is best understood as relying on a 
rejection of some unpalatable implications of utilitarianism similar to Rawls’ 
“separateness of persons” argument. But, absent further arguments—which 
Nozick explicitly declines providing (1974: 9)—that line of thought is 
compatible with any number of conceptions of rights, or of the limits of state 
power. 
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its only appeal, but it is our target here, given its role in Nozick’s 
argument and in “everyday libertarianism”. More importantly, as 
we will see in the final part of the paper, Nozick’s method 
exemplifies the reliance on “intuition pumps” that is so widespread 
in contemporary Anglophone political philosophy. 
To dispel some immediate doubts about our objection, two 
related clarifications are in order. First, we are not claiming that the 
coercive nature of the historical institution of private property is a 
problematic violation of the libertarian commitment to 
voluntarism and self-ownership. More generally, the issue is not 
that, in establishing private property rights, early states did 
something impermissible. We can remain neutral on that question.  
Second, as anticipated in the introduction, one may worry 
about the genetic fallacy: how can the causal history of a belief’s 
formation affect its truth-value? A preliminary way to answer that 
question is to draw on a version of what Bernard Williams calls the 
Critical Theory Principle: “If one comes to know that the sole 
reason one accepts some moral claim is that somebody’s power has 
brought it about that one accepts it, when, further, it is in their 
interest that one should accept it, one will have no reason to go on 
accepting it.” (2002: 231). As Williams recognises, this approach 
raises a number of further questions, e.g. “what counts as having 
been ‘produced by’ coercive power in the relevant sense” (2005: 6). 
Perhaps more importantly, why exactly does the justification not 
count? In extreme synthesis, our claim is that the concept of self-
ownership—which presupposes PP1—cannot be deployed to 
legitimise the capitalist state,18 in much the same way that a positive 
referee report written by a paper’s author should not be used to 
support that paper’s publication. This is not a point about the 
intrinsic quality of the report; it is a procedural point about the 
causal history of the report making it epistemically suspect. This 
sort of suspicion is particularly salient when the use context is an 
argument with high political stakes. To be clear, it is not as if we 
want to rule out the philosophical relevance of any folk beliefs 
about social practices that have been shaped by state coercion (e.g. 
beliefs about equal marriage, say). We simply argue that, for reasons 
of epistemic caution, those beliefs should not feature in arguments 
about state legitimacy. The discussion of ideology in the next 
section will unpack this thought. 
 Before exploring the methodological issues that will 
cement our ideology critique, we should pause to consider two 
possible objections on the libertarian’s behalf.  First, the Nozickian 
may reply that the invisible hand scenario is meant to portray a 
situation in which people like us (i.e. people socialised into advanced 
capitalist culture), not generic humans, create a state from scratch. 
One may say something similar in response to critics of Hobbes’ 
account of the state of nature: such a state may not have existed, 
but it would come into existence here and now if our government 
collapsed. The problem with this line of reply—at least for the 
 
18  The “markets without capitalism” position (Chartier and Johnson 2011) 
should fare better in light of our argument, but that is beyond this paper’s scope. 
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Nozickian—is that it makes the theory rather circular: people 
socialised into capitalism would set up a capitalist social system, but 
that doesn’t show whether being socialised into capitalism is a good 
thing. It doesn’t show that it is a bad thing either, but we don’t need 
to show that for our critique to go through. 
The Nozickian libertarian’s second objection points out that 
she has just imagined how a capitalist state could have arisen without 
rights-violations. As Nozick himself put it, “how a state would arise 
from that state of nature will serve our explanatory purposes, even 
if no actual state ever arose that way” (1974: 7). How this applies to any 
actual state is another matter. At the limit, a Nozickian could claim 
that the state she wants to justify is other than any existing states, 
and that the theory is not intended as a blueprint for modifying 
existing states. 
Two rejoinders are in order here. Firstly, as Bernard Williams 
(1975) presciently saw, many theorists have helped themselves to 
Nozick’s entitlement theory to defend capitalism in the actual 
world.  Not to mention the many appropriations of versions of 
Nozick’s entitlement theory in public political discourse as well as 
in academic contributions outside political philosophy—consider, 
for example, former chair of the US Presidency’s Council of 
Economic Advisers Gregory Mankiw’s 2013 paper ‘Defending the 
One Percent’, which features an (unacknowledged) version of 
Nozick’s entitlement-based ‘Wilt Chamberlain’ argument against 
progressive taxation. Another example is Richard Epstein’s (1985) 
extremely politically influential Lockean legal theory of property 
rights, which features in court decisions and even in US Supreme 
Court hearings (Ely 2006). Nozick’s famous comparison between 
taxation and forced labour also routinely appears in political 
rhetoric—sometimes in even more extreme forms, as in US 
Senator Rand Paul’s parallel between taxation and slavery 
(Kackzynski 2015). More generally, appeals to something like 
Nozick’s entitlement theory often feature in electioneering as well 
as in the intellectual demi-monde of countless fiscally conservative 
think thanks.19  
Secondly, Nozick acknowledges that differences between his 
hypothetical story and the actual world carry normative weight:  
More complicated are the cases where the actual 
history of an existing society is unjust yet some 
hypothetical just history could have led to the current 
structure (though perhaps not to the particular 
distribution of holdings or positions under it). If the 
hypothetical just history is ‘close’ to the actual history, 
whose injustices played no significant role in bringing 
about or maintaining the institutional structure, the 
actual structure will be as just as one can expect to get. 
(1974: 293).  
 
19 An exemplar: “The natural inclination is to hold on to one's wages, because 
the natural inclination is to associate wages with oneself, as an inalienable right. 
If I have a right to myself I have a right to what I produce, as against all men, 
even if they are organized and possess political power.” (Chodorov 1980).  
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The distinction between the institutional structure and the 
distribution of entitlements under it is important, though often 
overlooked by critics and defenders of Nozick alike, and even by 
Nozick himself. The distinction puts the spotlight on what kind of 
entitlements a society should have: not just the question of who 
gets what, but also the question of what ‘getting’ options are 
available. This matters here because within Nozick’s theory PP1 
asserts itself at the structural level without much argument—a 
suspicious move for critics of ideology. But the actual history, as 
we have seen, is not ‘close’ to a hypothetical in which PP1 is 
assumed, since PP1 was brought (perhaps unintentionally) about 
through the political coercion it is now supposed to legitimise.  
To bring that point into clearer focus it is worth briefly 
expanding on the role of PP1 in Nozick’s view, where folk beliefs 
about private property perform two separate tasks: establishing the 
appeal of self-ownership, and establishing the appeal of world-
ownership. Setting aside the difficulties with the latter, we want to 
focus on why self-ownership seems to require less by way of 
argument to get off the ground. Why it is that the relationship 
between an agent and her own body should be thought of through 
the lens of a political-legal construct such as PP1? The answer, we 
suggest, has something to do with the pervasiveness of a statist-
capitalist ideology. 
 The combination of self-ownership and world-ownership has 
to be compatible with a measure of negative liberty, which is why 
Nozick needs a theory of justice in acquisition. 20  He doesn’t 
however explain what his theory of justice in acquisition is, only 
that one is required. Contrary to some libertarians’ view but not 
Nozick’s, no version of the famous Lockean proviso suffices to 
provide such a theory.21 The proviso says that one may acquire 
parts of the world, provided that nobody is left worse off for it. 
But that is just to say that if appropriation is permissible, it should 
follow certain rules. The view has nothing to say to principled 
objections against private property rights over parts of the world 
other than persons’ own bodies, which is why Nozick cites a 
number of well-known general defences of private property which 
only “…enter a Lockean theory to support the claim that 
appropriation of private property satisfies the intent behind the 
‘enough and as good left over’ proviso, not as a utilitarian 
justification of property” (1974: 177). But, after rejecting Locke’s 
labour-mixing theory of acquisition, Nozick does not commit to 
any specific alternative. He assumes that one or the other will do. 
Even if one is willing to grant the self-ownership assumption, this 
assumption that there must be a correct theory to justify the 
 
20 Edward Feser (2005) holds the minority view that self-ownership suffices to 
derive world-ownership without a theory of acquisition. Our argument still 
applies, as self-ownership is PP1. 
21 Mike Otsuka (2004), for instance, maintains that a Scanlonian interpretation 
of the proviso (along the lines of “acquisition is justified just in in case nobody 
could reasonably reject it”) suffices to warrant acquisition. This move arguably 
conflates the conditions for specific acts of acquisition with its general 
permissibility. The former should be conditional on the latter. 
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acquisition of private property in the external world should alarm 
ideology critics.  
Other libertarians have tried to fill this gap in the position, e.g. 
by arguing that appropriation is justified by first claim, first use, 
discovery, first labour, object-making, integration with agents’ 
purposes, or a ‘finders keepers’ principle. Much scholarly opinion, 
however, remains sceptical about those attempts to overcome the 
difficulties with Locke’s labour-mixing view.22 So, libertarians who 
offer philosophically sophisticated defences of natural rights to 
private property—not to mention the many consequentialist, or 
instrumental defences of PP1—remain untouched by our 
argument. Not so for those who, like Nozick, rely on the folk 
appeal of PP1. For instance, Jan Narveson’s (inspired by Murray 
Rothbard and a wider Lockean current within American political 
discourse)23  maintains that all rights are property rights, i.e. he 
arguably grounds PP1 in the folk notion that we must have 
individual rights (1988: 66ff). An even clearer example is Michael 
Huemer. While he is commendably open to the possibility of 
mistaken intuitions, he explicitly states that his libertarianism rests 
on “common sense moral beliefs” (2013: 17). This move in turn 
requires a distinction between common sense morality and 
common sense political philosophy, with the latter cast as less 
reliable. But part of what our ideology critique aims to show is that 
the distinction between folk morality and folk political theory is not 
tenable, at least as long as political theory relies on moral beliefs 
and intuitions as its primary source of normativity.  
 
A methodological conclusion 
Let us conclude with some more general considerations on the 
sources of normativity in political theory. We submit that the 
pejoratively ideological character of libertarian entitlement-based 
defences of capitalism is connected to their political moralism in 
Bernard Williams’ (2005) sense of the term, and that the sort of 
genealogical critique we carried out above can help overcoming 
that problem, which is widespread in contemporary political 
philosophy.  
 Nozick’s method is peculiar when confronted with the 
dominant methodology of western political thought (the last four 
decades excluded), insofar as it derives political recommendations 
from pre-political moral commitments rather than from an 
understanding of specifically political concepts (power, authority, 
and the like): “Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the 
boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may 
not do to one another limits what they may do through the 
 
22 Wenar (1998) and Widerquist (2010) provide piercingly exhaustive treatments 
of those views. 
23 After noting its pervasiveness (“the idea that there is something distinctively 
friendly to libertarian thought in American intellectual and political culture is 
hard to distinguish from the idea that there is something especially Lockean 
about that culture”), Levy (2017: 23) provides a roadmap of how libertarians 
may move away from this Lockeanism.  
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apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus” (Nozick 
1974: 6). Yet this work of political theory written “in the mode of 
much contemporary philosophical work in epistemology or 
metaphysics” (ibid.: x) was to prove enormously successful from a 
methodological point of view, though not in terms of the views 
espoused in the work. In fact one may say that, if Rawls 
transformed the discipline, it was Nozick’s rather different method 
that set a large part of the agenda for the debate on that 
transformative book and other major developments in 
Anglophone political philosophy. This method is characterised 
(inter alia) by reliance on ‘intuition pumps’ and other types of 
thought experiments, as well as other argumentative strategies 
designed to appeal to pre-theoretical, common sense judgments 
(Brownlee & Stemplowska 2017). This approach is prevalent 
across political philosophy, and predominant in large subfields: one 
need only think of the ‘equality of what’ or the equality-priority-
sufficiency debate with its vignettes featuring simplified disabilities 
and lazy surfers, or population ethics’ fanciful alternative histories, 
of revisionist just war theory’s extensive use of analogies meant to 
extend out intuitions about schoolyard fistfights to war between 
states. To name just one prominent example, in a practical guide 
on “How to Write Analytical Political Theory”, Robert Goodin 
says that we should try to “get support for some proposition about 
which we feel less confident by showing that it follows from some 
other proposition in which we’re more certain”, and that “The way 
that in practice plays out in applied moral philosophy is via 
‘intuition pumps’, examples (often contrived, artificial) about 
which we have a strong intuitive response.” (Goodin 2017: 19). 
Goodin does warn intuitions may misfire; we hope to have 
improved our understanding of how that can happen, hopefully in 
ways that should caution us against equating political theory with 
‘applied moral philosophy’. Indeed, part of what our analysis aims 
to bring out is that Nozick’s influential departure from the 
methodological canon of Western political theory was not a 
felicitous turn. Regardless of what one thinks of the role of 
intuitions in epistemology and metaphysics, there is reason to be 
weary of intuitions in political philosophy. Nozick’s 
methodological shortcomings are partly due to his ethics-first and 
intuition-driven approach. He imagines people in the state of 
nature with the sorts of rights we think people have because we 
live under a capitalist system. He never explains why it is a good 
idea to ascribe such rights of self-ownership. As we have seen, he 
may reply that he simply wants to come up with a theory that 
appeals to people like us. But this undermines his methodology: it 
is hardly surprising that people like us have certain intuitions and 
beliefs about rights and the state, and to derive conclusions from 
those and then demand that we use those conclusions to disregard 
other intuitions we may have (e.g. about redistribution) is to 
demand too much.  
Many different ideological traditions contribute to our 
normative outlook, and many ethics-first approaches don’t have a 
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clear methodology to adjudicate those clashes of intuitions (they 
are clashes of different bits of ‘ethics as dead politics’, to return to 
Geuss’ phrase: different past victors jostling for power in the 
present).24 So the theory of legitimacy in Part I of Anarchy, State and 
Utopia is an ideological exercise that cannot be as ‘explanatory’ as 
Nozick wants it to be (Gaus 2011). The point is not just that 
Nozick’s merely reflects but does not ground a certain libertarian 
normative outlook. The point is that it reflects some ‘common 
sense’ commitments whose specific role in philosophical defences 
of state forms does not withstand critical scrutiny. And it won’t do 
to argue, with Huemer, that “common sense political philosophy 
is more controversial than common sense morality” (2013: 17). His 
argument is, roughly, that most humans have a tendency to obey 
authority figures and that states and governments have a powerful 
influence on our cognitive capacities, so our common sense 
judgments about political structures are unreliable and prone to 
rationalization (ibid.: 109ff). We do not disagree with this argument 
insofar as it attacks common sense beliefs in authority. But we 
think it does not show the superiority of moral to political common 
sense judgments, simply because it ignores the political sources of 
many moral judgments that ostensibly concern purely personal 
matters—such as the form of ownership of one’s body, to return 
to our main focus.  Indeed the very considerations one may adduce 
in support of scepticism about political authority should at least 
lead us to examine the genealogy of our purportedly pre-political 
or apolitical moral beliefs. Incidentally, that is one of the lessons 
from the time-honoured feminist slogan, “the personal is political”.  
Our methodological criticism, then, ties in with an aspect of 
the wider realist critique of mainstream political theory: political 
prescriptions derived exclusively or primarily from pre-political 
moral commitments can turn out to be ideological in self-defeating 
or, at any rate, problematic ways. This is not say that all reliance on 
intuitions and folk beliefs is to be discarded. Rather, some such 
intuitions and beliefs are not suited to the tasks assigned to them. 
So we have shown that there is a role for genealogical ideology 
critique within normative political theory. But this role is 
different—narrower and more targeted—than the one found 
within traditional forms of ideology critique. Our critique targets 
specific uses of a concept within specific arguments. It does not 
seek to taint whole concepts because of their unsavoury pedigree. 
And when it does rule out the use of a concept in a given argument, 
it does so on epistemic rather than moral grounds. It is precisely 
the commitment to widely shared epistemic values that counsels 
genealogical scrutiny of concepts used to justify power relations, 
lest the boundary between truth and power become blurrier than it 
needs to be. 
 
 
 
 
24 For this critique of intuitionism in normative political theory see Rossi (2016) 
and, for the wider realist research agenda in which it is embedded, Rossi (2019). 
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